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Abstract
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) proposed a way to estimate markups under imper-
fect competition from firm-level data. The basic idea is first to estimate the elasticity
of output with respect to a variable factor of production, and then divide this elastic-
ity by the share of the input expenditure in the relevant sales. This note argues that
this way to estimate markups is aﬀected by a problem of circularity: under imperfect
competition, to estimate the elasticity of an input you need to know, or estimate at the
same time, the markups. The application of the proposal, ignoring this fact, is likely to
produce inconsistent estimates and generate large biases in inferences about markups.
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1. Introduction
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), henceforth DLW, proposed a way to estimate markups
under imperfect competition from firm-level data. The basic idea is first to estimate the
elasticity of output with respect to a variable factor of production, and then divide this
elasticity by the share of the input expenditure in the relevant sales. The procedure has
been recently applied by De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelval and Pavcnick (2016), and is
becoming increasingly popular. This note argues that this way to estimate markups is
aﬀected by a problem of circularity: under imperfect competition, to estimate the elasticity
of an input you need to know, or estimate at the same time, the markups.1 The application
of the proposal, ignoring this fact, is likely to produce inconsistent estimates and generate
large biases in inferences about markups.2
Let’s anticipate intuitively why this happens. Having prices, markups follow if one can
estimate marginal cost.3 The idea is that the output elasticity of a variable input can be used
to infer production marginal cost. The problem is that, in the standard setting and from cost
minimization, the elasticity of no input can be estimated consistently if marginal cost is not
observed or, at least, simultaneously estimated.4 In particular, when unobservable marginal
1The reader at this point may ask with surprise how is possible that this has gone unnoticed until now.
The answer probably lies in the loose treatment of output and input prices in the literature on structural
estimation of production functions. This loose treatment has been favored in turn by the scarcity of price
data.
2Both mentioned articles reach unconventional conclusions. DLW finds that the markups of Eslovenian
exporters are, for the same products in a more competitive market, greater than the markups of the non-
exporters. De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelval and Pavcnick (2016) find that Indian firms increased their
market power after a tariﬀ liberalization. The lack of reliability of the markup measurements raises doubts
on the robustness of the results.
3DLW suggest that their way to estimate markups gives also valid inferences on the diﬀerences of these
markups in the absence of firm-level prices (although they recognize possible problems when varying input
elasticities are used). What follows will demonstrate that the absence of firm-level prices induces important
additional biases. Moreover, the negative correlation argued by Klette and Griliches (1996) between firm
prices and inputs only holds under their assuption that demand heterogeneity is iid.
4This doesn’t happen under perfect competition because marginal cost is observed through the price.
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cost is replaced by its determinants one cannot ignore demand heterogeneity without the
risk of biases.5 The problem becomes more acute if there are adjustment costs of any
variable input (e.g. labor) because they constitute a non-ignorable part of the input prices
and the own marginal cost.
In Section 2 we restate the setting for the estimation of markups. Section 3 explains the
need to deal with marginal cost. Section 4 briefly discusses the added diﬃculties when there
are adjustment costs. Section 5 suscintly compares with profit maximization, that can be
also dynamic. Section 6 analyzes the generated biases. Section 7 sketches the alternative
suggested in Jaumandreu and Yin (2016) for the case of monopolistic competition, and
Jaumandreu and Lin (2016) in a more general case. Appendix A develops an example to
sign the bias.
2. The setting for estimating markups
First, let’s make clear what is understood by the standard setting. Assume, as in DLW,
that firms compete in an imperfectly competitive market in an unspecified way.6 Only the
assumption that firms minimize costs is going to be used. Firm  produces with a given
amount of capital, and freely variable amounts of labor and materials, with production
function  = ln ( ) + . Variable  represents Hicks-neutral productivity,
that evolves over time as a first order Markov process,  = (−1)+, and is observed by
the firm but unobserved by the econometrician.7 Observed production is  = +. The
disturbance  uncorrelated with the inputs, accounts for the diﬀerence between output 
and observed output. Variable inputs have been chosen to produce the "planned" quantity
 .8 Capital is taken as given to account for the fact that its adjustment is particularly
5See Jaumandreu and Yin (2018) for an account on the existence and importance of demand heterogeneity.
6Products, in particular, can be homogeneous or diﬀerentiated.
7The Markov process can be exogenous or endogenous, the latter including some variable that shifts the
expected value of productivity as expenditures in R&D, exports or innovation dummies. See, for example,
Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013), De Loecker (2013) and Peters, Roberts, Vuong and Fryges (2017).
8The most natural way of interpreting the diﬀerence between  and  is as picking up the unpredictable
shocks at the time of setting the quantities of the variable inputs. It can also be interpreted as a pure
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costly and requires time.9 At some point of the discussion we will consider adjustment cost
of the input labor while we keep materials completely variable.10
The work by Hall (1990), drawing on Solow (1957), showed that, under cost minimization,
the FOC of a variable input (materials, say),
  = 





where  ≡ 

 stands for the elasticity of output with respect to materials. If we
observe the materials bill and the quantity of output that the materials were set to produce,
having the elasticity of the input amounts to have marginal cost and conversely. The FOC





where  =  is the relevant revenue share
3. Dealing with non-observable marginal cost
The elasticity  is, however, non-observed, so it should be estimated through the
estimation of the production function. The estimation of the production function will
also provide an empirical measurement of  DLW propose estimating  by means
of an Olley and Pakes (1996)/ Levisohn and Petrin (2003) procedure, henceforth OP/LP,
implemented in the form proposed by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015), from now on
ACF. An OP/LP procedure consists of replacing the unobservable  in the production
measurement error.
9The assumptions on the production function are the general assumptions used in the literature on
stuctural estimation of production functions and productivity: see, for example, Olley and Pakes (1996),
Levinshon and Petrin (2003), Akerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015) and Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013).
10Materials are however not likely to be completely variable because of the presence of subcontracting of
parts and pieces (see Doraszelski and Jaumandreu, 2018).
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function by an inverted input demand. The implementation proposed by ACF estimates in a
first step the disturbance  that separates observed output from relevant output, throwing
all the arguments of the production function and the inverted demand in a nonparametric
estimation of  = (·).
DLW proposal overlooks that, under varying markups, no OP/LP method of estimation
can produce a consistent estimate of  and the residual  regardless whether an ACF
or any other implementation form is used, except in the case that markups are estimated
simultaneously with the elasticity. This is true either in the case of static cost minimization
or in the case of cost minimization with adjustment costs. It becomes transparent with
profit maximization and dynamic pricing. As stated before, we start the discussion with
static cost minimization.
Our argument proceeds in two stages. First, given cost minimization we demonstrate
that either we observe marginal cost (what amounts to observe the markups) or we need
to replace  by its determinants. Second, we show that the replacement of  by its
determinants violates the "scalar unobservable assumption" needed for the consistency of
OP/LP procedures (Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry and Pakes, 2007).
Equations generated by cost minimization.
The problem of cost minimization is
  +    ( ) =  exp()
The first order conditions are
 ( ) exp() = 
 ( ) exp() = 
where we write the Lagrange multiplier of the problem as marginal cost  Let’s briefly
derive, for the sake of the discussion, the demand for the inputs conditional on output,
variable cost (the function value) and marginal cost (the derivative of the function value).
Using the ratio of first order conditions together with the production function we can solve
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for the output-conditional demand for the variable inputs
 = (  

exp())
 = (  

exp())
Plugging these demands into the objective function, variable cost turns out to be
  =  (  

exp())
and hence marginal cost is
 =  
=  4(  

exp()) exp(−)
Notice that all these expressions are implications of the primitive assumptions (cost min-
imization, fixed capital and variable labor and materials, Hicks-neutral productivity). No
functional form assumption has been added.
Which among these expressions can be inverted to substitute for  in the production
function? Ideally one would like to rely in the first order conditions, where there is no ,
but then marginal cost is not observable and must be replaced.11 If one replaces  by
its expression, exp() drops from both FOCs leaving only the ratios 

exp() 12 The FOCs
written in this way have the same problem that the conditional demands, we can invert
them for  but the resulting expressions are going to be conditional on 13 But output
11Can be here useful the fact that  is observable up to a set of parameters? For example  =

 exp() where  =

 or average cost of materials. Also  =
 
+ exp()
where   =    In both cases the disturbance  violates the "scalar unobservable assumption."
However, notice that this provides an estimable model at the price of giving up the nonlinearity of the
Markov process.
12Can improve the things the assumption that  is independent of output? In this case   =
( ) 

exp() and  = ( ) exp(−) It is easy to see that  drops from the
FOCs, so we can only rely on the conditional input demands.
13One may wonder what happens if the ratio

exp() is replaced inverting for this ratio one of the
conditional demands, materials say. Interestingly enough, one gets an expression for  with no other
unobservables than   = ( ) exp(−) But the expression is not useful for
our current purposes since  drops from the FOC.
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 is also non-observable. In fact  is just exactly what we want to estimate in the first
stage of the ACF implementation.14 An OP/LP procedure without observing  needs
to replace  by its determinants.
Using observables to replace marginal cost and planned output.
Replacing  by its determinants seems to be in fact the route taken by DLW, although
never is explicitly stated. There is a key ambiguity when DLW say "We follow Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) and rely on material demand
 = (  )
to proxy for productivity by inverting(·) where we collect additional variables potentially
aﬀecting optimal input demand choice in the vector ”15 According to our discussion the
list of variables that has to be included in  is very precise: the input prices  and 
as well as all the determinants of  Here is exactly where the problem resides, demanded
 is in general a function  = (  )16 where  stands for observed demand
shifters and  is unobserved demand heterogeneity. Vector  of observable variables can
then be specified as  = (    ) but, in addition, the presence of unobserved
demand heterogeneity  has to be accounted for. The demand for materials becomes
 = (   )
14 In fact notice that we are going to include  as an argument of (·), so we will have  = ( ) =
( (·)) ≡ (·) and the arguments of (·) will be only the argumants of (·)
15Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) proposed in fact to use  = ( ) noticing that "input and output
prices are assumed to be common across firms (they are suppressed)" (page 322). They had in mind a
competitive industry, as Appendix A of page 338 makes clear. Under imperfect competition, equal output
and input prices is neither necessary nor suﬃcient condition to be able to write an expression as above.
Under profit maximization, for example, if prices are equal we still need the equality of the markups (see
below). Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015) recognize the diﬃculty to integrate imperfectly competitive
firms in their framework to estimate production functions and redirect the reader to the approach that we
are criticizing (page 2436).
16Planned producction can however be diﬀerent from expected demand if the firm expects to cover part
of the demand with inventories or, on the contrary, plans to accumulate some.
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Unfortunately, the demand heterogeneity embodied in  violates the "scalar unobservable"
assumption that we need for an OP/LP method to work.17
Inverting this demand we get
 = (  )
Substituting this expression for  in the production function, and collecting all observable
variables in the vector 18 it becomes clear that the first stage of the ACF procedure has
to estimate
 = ( ) + 
As we do not observe  the regression will produce estimates of the (·) function and the
residuals  that diﬀer from the true values. Notice that this is true regardless whether 
is correlated or not with the included variables, although in general we should expect to be
correlated.
4. Dynamic cost minimization
There can be adjustment costs of an input, and then the problem of cost minimization
is dynamic. Assume, without loss of generality, that only labor has adjustment costs.
Jaumandreu and Lin (2017) show that the relevant labor FOC for cost minimization can
be written as
 =(1 +∆)
where ∆ represents the gap between the wage and the shadow price of labor under adjust-
ment costs (in practice it measures the extent to which adjustment costs are not included
17Demand heterogeneity is currently recognized as an important fact. The first paper dealing with demand
in the context of production function estimation, Klette and Griliches (1996), assumed  an uncorrelated
error. This is also the assumption in DeLoecker (2011) once z has been accounted for. Today  is
recognized as an autocorrelated unobservable, as important as  or even more, and correlated with it. See
Jaumandreu and Yin (2018) for a review of the relevant literature and an empirical assessment.
18Notice that, as previously remarked, (·) is no longer a function of other observable variables than the
arguments of (·) In our notation,  = ( )
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in the variation of the observed wage). The relevant price of labor can be now thought
of  ∗ = (1 + ∆) and marginal cost includes now the unobservable ∆ For exam-
ple, Jaumandreu and Lin (2017) show that the relationship marginal cost-observed average
variable cost becomes
 = 1 (1 + ∆
)
where  is the share of wages in observable variable costs. It is not only that the compu-
tation of the markup cannot be based in the FOC for labor, is that the estimation of any
elasticity is going to be afected by inconsistency if the cost of labor is mispecified and this
cyclical determinant of marginal cost omitted. The absence of control for this unobservable
creates a problem similar to the omision of control for 
5. Profit maximization
Cost minimization doesn’t allow to consistently estimate input elasticities without know-
ing, or estimating at the same time, markups. Is this possible if we assume profit maxi-
mization? The answer is no, provided that markups vary. Proft maximization produces the
conditions
 ( ) exp() = 
 ( ) exp() =  
To replace  we can use any of the FOCs or, provided that returns to scale are nonconstant,
we can solve the system and get the unconditional demand for materials, say,
 =(  

  )
To implement any of these solutions we must be able to specify  Since  =
 we can always write  = (1 + 1− ) what makes clear that having prices
available we still need to know the markups. Expression (1+
1−
 ) can be written without
loss of generality as (1− 1 ) where  is the "shadow" elasticity of demand or elasticity
of demand thet will cause the firm to set the observed markup if it were pricing statically
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as a monopolist of its product. In any case, there is no hope to consistently estimate input
elasticities without controlling for this heterogeneity. Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013)
faced this problem estimating ln(1 − 1 ) as an argument of the demand for the input,
modeling  as an unknown function of the firm-level ouput price and the intercept of the
output demand.
The relevant elasticity may have diﬀerent interpretations. It can be assumed to coincide
with the individual demand elasticity, as it is the case in monopolistic competition. But it
may be also a function of the aggregate elasticity of demand and market structure measures
if the market is product-homogeneous. In Cournot competition, for example,  = 
where  is the market share of the firm. Nothing precludes this shadow elasticity to
emerge from a complex price competition oligopoly model or being a complicated function
of the state variables of a dynamic pricing problem (see Jaumandreu and Lin, 2017).
The flexible estimation of these elasticities may alleviate partially the problem of speci-
fication of marginal cost. It can be, as we show later, a way to avoid the estimation of the
heterogeneity of demand. But it cannot avoid the need to be specific, for example, about
the cyclical properties of elasticity and the ratio marginal-average cost (closely related to
adjustment costs).
6. Econometric biases
Let’s take the case of  as the relevant unobservable (in practice it can also be ∆ or
both  and ∆). The first stage of the ACF procedure should be based on the regression
 = ( ) + 
However, because the heterogeneity embedded in  is unobservable, the first stage can
only rely on the integrated conditional expectation
 = e() +  +  = e() + e
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where e is by construction mean-independent of  The feasible second stage of ACF will
have to be based on the regression
 = ln ( ) + (e(−1) + −1 − ln (−1 −1−1)) +  + 
Notice that this regression includes a function e(−1) diﬀerent from ( ) and unob-
served heterogeneity −1 presumably correlated with   and inside the function
(·) There is no hope to get  by standard methods Let’s denote e the elasticity
obtained from this regression ignoring the problem of unobserved heterogeneity and let us
use it together with e to construct the markup
e = e exp(−e)
or, in logs,
ln e = ln  + ln e − e
It is easy to see that ln  = ln− ln+ 19 so the constructed markup will
have the relationship that follows with the true markup
ln e = ln + (ln e − ln) + ( − e) = ln + 
The unconditional expectation of the constructed markup is biased since
(ln e) = ln +() = ln +(ln e − ln)
where to obtain the () we use that () = (e) = 0 In Appendix A we develop
an example that suggests a positive bias under the assumption of a positive relationship
between the input and heterogeneity of demand . On the other hand the unobservable
∆, component of the price of the labor input, is likely to be negatively related to 











 exp(−) = ln − ln + 
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Call now  to some variable for which we want to test whether it is associated to a
diﬀerent markup level and has been included in the vector  (as, for example, the export
status of DLW) The conditional expectation of the constructed markup is biased since
(ln e|) = (ln|) +(|)
where (|) = (ln e− ln|)+(|) 6= 0We drop the term (e|) =
0
Notice that first term of the bias is independent of the type of variation of e and
 The estimated parameter may be a constant, i. e. e = e , and we can still have
a varying  The second term of the bias shows that the possible endogeneity of variable
 in the explanation of  cannot be ignored because the employed procedure has failed
to control for 
In summary, both the level of the markups and its variation according to key variables
of interest are likely to be biased.
7. Sketch of solution
As suggested in Jaumandreu and Yin (2018) for the monopolistic competition case, and
in Jaumandreu and Lin (2017) for the case of dynamic pricing, the solution is to augment







  = − ln( + ) + ln + 
 = 0 +  +  +  + ((−1−1 −1 − −1 −1 − −1 −1) +  + 
where the markups  can be specified as flexible as it is convenient, can provide simultane-
ous consistent estimates of the elasticities of the inputs and markups. Our example features
a CD production function, but there is no diﬃculty in using any other production function
(for example with varying elasticities). Estimation can be carried out simultaneously or in
two steps. The first equation alone cannot identify separately elasticities and markups, but
it can provide a function of both to be imposed as restriction in the second equation.
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Appendix A
Let’s put an example to show the likely bias. Here we drop firm and time suscripts.
Production function is  = ++ =  + and demand function  = −+ From cost
minimization it turns out that  =  −  so substitution gives (  ) =  +  − 
= −+ Assume that (| ) =  (we assume no relation between  and  for simplicity)
and write  =  +  in error form So e( ) = − +  The true equation underlying
second ACF stage is  =  + (−−1 + −1 + −1 − −1) +  +  To put a sign to the
bias consider that (·) is autoregresive of known parameter  and that variables −1 and −1
are uncorrelated. The equation becomes  = − −1 + −1 + −1 − −1 +  +  A
standard IV estimation for  would be based on the moment (−1) = (−1(−−1))−
(−1−1) +(−1) where  = −1 + −1 +  +  The estimator
e = (−1)(−1( − −1)) =  + (−1)(−1( − −1))
is positively biased because (−1) = (2−1)  0.
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